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Abstract
We analyze the e¤ects of population aging on public expenditure
when government is not fully e¢ cient. We build an overlapping gener-
ations model in which government collects money from the households
through a proportional tax on wages and redistributes the resources in
the form of pensions and a subsidy to education. The individual votes
for the level of public assistance to receive in order to maximize her util-
ity. We nd that the solution of the model depends on the preferences
of the median voter and that as population ages, more pensions are
demanded in the economy relative to the subsidy to education, which
makes the individuals invest less in the human capital formation of their
children and lead economy to be less productive. We also demonstrate
that government ine¢ ciency plays a crucial role in the redistribution
of resources and that the solution of such an ine¢ ciency gap may slow
down the negative e¤ects of population aging.
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1 Introduction
The improvement in the standards of living, resulting from both the betterment
in the health sector and in the socioeconomic wellbeing that the industrial
economies experienced in the past decades, led to an increase in the number
of retired people eligible to receive old-age social security. In the past sixty
years, the median age of the population has increased from 29 to 37 years and
is expected to increase more in the next century, reaching a median age of 45
years in the developed world - United States, Europe, Japan - and of 36 in the
developing world - Africa, Latin America, South eastern Asia.1
Data from the OECD countries indicate that the dependency ratio of old
people - 65 and more years old - and people in the working age - 15 to 64 years
old - almost doubled from 12:36% in 1950 to 21:25% in 2013 and is expected
to reach a value of 36:26% in 2050, as a consequence of the population aging.
This led to an increasing trend in the share of government spending devoted
to old-age pensions, which, in the majority of the industrial economies, is the
largest component of the transfers operated by the government, with a share
of almost 17% in average in the OECD countries for the year 2009, over a total
share of 33% of the government spending devoted to social protection.
On the contrary, the share of government spending devoted to education
is usually the third voice of the public budget, with a share of 13% in average
in the OECD countries for the year 2009, forerun by the public spending in
health with a share of almost 15%.
The limited resources of the public sector, mainly coming from tax collec-
tion, force the governments to make a continuous choice between investments
in productive sectors - as education - and non-productive ones - social security
and health sector - with evident consequences on economic growth. Indeed,
on one side, greater investments in education drive to the formation of hu-
man capital which in turns leads to an increase in the level of the GDP per
capita. On the other side, when the greater share of the government spending
is devoted to pensions, households gains more utility from posticipating their
consumption, with a contraction in GDP per capita.
In our paper we introduce an overlapping generations model in which the
government collects money from the households through a proportional tax
on wage and redistributes the resources among agents in the form of pensions
and a subsidy to education. Pensions are paid to the retired agents living in
the reference period, while the subsidy is paid to the households who use it to
partially nance education to their children. The human capital accumulated
by the young agents living in the economy is used in the following period as
an input in the production function and thus, increases the level of GDP per
capita. We assume a majority of working individuals in the economy, hence
1Source, OECD (2013), "Trends Shaping Education, 2013".
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government maximizes the utility of the adult agents by choosing the optimal
rate of the proportional tax on wage and the optimal level of the subsidy to
education and taking into account their preferences between current and future
consumption, as well as the altruism they have towards their children and par-
ents. Moreover, government decision on how to allocate its total expenditure is
the result of a voting process in which the median voters preference on either
the education to supply to her children or the pensions used by her parents
to nance their current consumption plays a crucial role in determining the
productivity of the economy.
We demonstrate that, as population ages, more pensions are demanded and,
keeping constant the rate of the proportional tax on wage, a lower subsidy
to education is o¤ered to households. As a consequence of that, economy
becomes less productive. Furthermore, we also introduce a certain degree of
ine¢ ciency in the public sector of the economy and explore the consequences
of such ine¢ ciency in the amount of resources that the government is able to
redistribute.
Previous literature has focused its attention on the relationship between
population aging and public expenditure, both in the form of expenditure on
education and expenditure on social protection.
McDonald and Budge (2005) nd out that the proportion of the popula-
tion aged 65 and older has a strong positive inuence on government social
spending, after controlling for the ideology of the political party in power. On
the other hand, Disney (2007), using data of 21 countries from the OECD,
shows that the size of the welfare state is positively related to the relative size
of the population aged 65 and older, this time controlling for economic and
social factors.
The combined results of McDonald and Budge (2005) and Disney (2007)
imply that, controlling for both political and economic factors, as population
ages, the greater number of older people living the economy forces the govern-
ment to shift its investment decisions to less productive voices of its budget.
The model we set up in this paper is close to the one presented by Razin,
Sadka and Swagel (2002). They study the e¤ects of population aging de-
veloping an overlapping generations model of intra-generetional transfers and
human capital formation. Their main result is that, as the dependency ratio
of old to adult agents falls, government reacts with either an increase of tax
rate or a decrease in its transfersgenerosity. Such conclusion is similar to the
result we obtain from our paper.
Similar mechanisms are pointed out by Bongaarts (2004), who focuses his
attention on the payment schemes of the pensions systems in the OECD coun-
tries. His ndings are interesting for our purposes and are partially conrmed
by our model. Indeed, Bongaarts (2004) shows empirically that, as the ratio
of working households to retired ones falls, the share of public expenditure
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devoted to pensions is destined to increase in the next decades.
Nonetheless, both Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) and Bongaarts (2004)
focus their attention on the consequences of the population aging on the pen-
sions system only.
In contrast with that, we explore the consequences of population aging on
both the expenditure in education and the security system of the economy.
A conspicuous part of the literature on economic growth explores the re-
lationship between public education and public pensions in the framework of
an overlapping generations model with government transfers. Among the oth-
ers, Glomm and Kaganovich (2003) model an economy in which government
allocate its resources between education and a pay-as-you-go pensions system.
Parentsdecisions to invest resources in education of their children are moti-
vated by altruism, a feature that we also include in our model. Their ndings
are mainly aimed in showing the changes in the formation of human capital,
rather than the e¤ects of population aging.
On the other hand, Boldrin and Montes (2009) use micro and macro data
for Spain to show that, when demographic changes are allowed in the model,
the redistribution of resources operated by the government is not e¢ cient.
Nonetheless, population aging does not necessarily make the future generations
to be worst o¤, a conclusion that we also share.
The paper is organized as follow. In Section 2 we set up the model and
study its equilibrium. In section 3 we calibrate the benchmark model and
present the result of its numerical simulation. In section 4 we compute the
comparative statistics in order to show the e¤ects of the population aging,
as well as those of the government ine¢ ciency. Section 5 presents empirical
evidences of the theoretical model. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a small open economy populated by overlapping generations who live
for three periods. Firms, households and the public sector are active in the
economy.
2.1 Firms
Firms operating in the economy produce a single nal good by means of a
neoclassical aggregated production function with constant returns to scale,
Yt = AK

t H
1 
t ; (1)
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with  2 [0; 1], where A is the productivity level of the economy, Kt is the
aggregated capital stock in period t and Ht is the aggregated stock of human
capital, in period t. Human capital depends positively on the education that
agents received when they were young,Ht = Nt e

t 1, where  and  2 [0:1] are
respectively the productivity of education and the elasticity of human capital
to education.
The production function per unit of human capital is obtained by dividing
both sides of the production function by Ht,
byt = Abkt : (2)
Note that, for any variables xt, it holds the following condition
bxt = xt
ht
; (3)
Hence, in equation (2), bkt = KtHt = ktht is the capital per human capital,
where ht =  e

t 1.
We assume an exogenous interest rate which is equal to r. Moreover, we
assume that capital fully depreciates at the end of each period.
Firms are assumed to behave according to perfect competition, hence each
production factor (i.e. Kt and Ht) pays its marginal productivity, therefore,
bR = Abk 1 (4)
and
bw = (1  )Abk (5)
Where bR = 1 + br.
Hence, for any given interest rate r it is possible to nd its associated value
of per capita capital bk and wage bw.
The GDP per capita, on the other hand, is equal to
yt = ( bw + bRbkt)ht: (6)
2.2 Households
Individuals in the economy live for three periods. At the beginning of each
period a new generation is born, while agents make economic decisions only
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in the last two periods of their life. In the rst period, when they are young,
agents neither work nor consume, but receive education by their parents; in
the second period, sub indexed with t, agents are adult and work, while in the
third one, sub indexed with t+ 1, individuals are old and they are retired.
Individuals belonging to the generation living in period t maximize the
following logarithmic utility function,
u(cyt ; c
o
t+1; et; c
o
t ; c) = ln (c
y
t ) +  ln
 
cot+1

+  ln(et) +  ln(c
o
t   c) (7)
where cyt is the consumption of the agent in the current period, when she
is adult, cot+1 is the consumption of the agent in the future period, when she
is retired, et is the education that the household pays to her children born in
t   1, cot is the consumption of old agents in the current period (i.e. the con-
sumption of the parents of the maximizing household), and c is their minimum
consumption level. The inclusion of c is an important feature in our model,
since it reduces the budget of the old agents living in period t and incentivates
the demand for pensions.
Therefore, the altruistic household receives utility from giving to both her
children and parents, besides the utility she gets from her consumption in the
present and in the future period.
The parameters ,  and  explain, respectively, the temporal discount
factor between current and future consumption, the altruism that the house-
holds has towards her children and the interest that she has with respect to
her parentswellbeing.
In the framework of the model, individuals make their decisions subject
to a budget constraint. On one hand, adult agents use their net income to
nance their current consumption, to save for future consumption and to pay
education to their children, which cost is lowered by a subsidy paid by the
government.
Thus,
(1   t) bwht = cyt + st + (1  t)et (8)
where  t is a proportional tax on income bwht 1, st are the savings and t
is the subsidy paid by the government which, in turns, is nanced by taxes.
On the other hand, old agents nance their consumption in the future
using the savings, augmented by the interest rate and the pension paid by the
government.
Thus,
st bR + pt+1 = cot+1 (9)
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where pt+1 is the pension paid by the government in the future period
which, in turns, is nanced by taxes.
Solving (9) with respect to st and substituting it into (8) it is possible to
obtain the intertemporal budget constraint, which is the restriction that the
individual faces when she maximizes the intertemporal utility function,
(1   t) bwht = cyt + st = cot+1bR   pt+1bR + (1  t)et (10)
2.3 Government
As already pointed out, young agents living and working in period t pay a
proportional tax  t on their wage bwht 1. Government uses the collected taxes
to nance education, through the subsidy t, and to provide pensions pt to the
old agents living in the current period. Thus, the following condition holds,
 t bwhtNt = tetNt + ptNt 1 (11)
where again Nt is the total number of agents working in period t. Note that
there might be a source of government ine¢ ciency driven by the parameter
 2 [0; 1]. Indeed, for  < 1, not the entire amount of taxes collected by
the government is distributed among the individuals in the form of subsidy to
education and pensions. This might be because of the presence of tax collecting
costs or corruption in the government.
From the governments budget constrain we can obtain the equation for
the pensions,
pt = (1 + n)( t bwht   tet) (12)
where n > 0 is the population growth rate.
2.4 Equilibrium
The economy is in an equilibrium when the production and consumption sides,
as well as the public sector are in equilibrium.
For a given interest rate r, equations (4) and (5) give the capital and the
wage per unit of human capital which ensure the equilibrium.
The maximization of (7) with respect to (10) leads to the following rst
order conditions for the current and future consumptions and education,
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cyt =
1
(1 +  + )

(1   t) bwht 1 + pt+1bR

; (13)
cot+1 =
 bR
(1 +  + )

(1   t) bwht 1 + pt+1bR

(14)
and
et =

(1 +  + )(1  t)

(1   t) bwht 1 + pt+1bR

(15)
Note, in particular, that the condition for education clearly shows that an
increase in the amount of the subsidy t provided by the government increases
the stock of education that households want to supply to their children. Fur-
thermore, the condition for the current consumption of old agents remarks
that they receive utility from both the pension they receive in t and the wage
they earned in t  1, which in turns depends on the education they received in
t  2.
The government maximizes the utility function expressed by (7), given the
optimal conditions for the current and future consumptions and education
in order to choose those values of proportional tax on wage and subsidy to
education which maximize
Vt(c
y
t ; c
o
t+1; et; c
o
t ; c) = ln (c
y
t ) +  ln
 
cot+1

+  ln(et) +  ln(c
o
t   c): (16)
Substituting equations from (13) to (15) into the indirect utility function
(16) and derivating it towards  t and t, the government sets the equilibrium
values of tax and subsidy that maximize the household utility function,
 t =
 bR bwht + pt+1
(1 +  + + ) bR bwht   (17)
(1 +  + )
h
 bR(1   t 1) bwht 1   (1 + n)tet   (1 +  + )ci
(1 +  + + )(1 + n)bwht
and
t =
 bR(1   t 1) bwht 1 + (1 + n) t bwht   (1 +  + )c
( + ) (1 + n)et
  
( + )
(18)
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3 Calibration and Results
In order to show the e¤ects of population aging on the equilibrium value of the
proportional tax on wage and the one of the subsidy to education, we carry
out a numerical simulation of the model. We calibrate the model under the
assumption that each period t is twenty-ve years long. The parameters are
calibrated so to replicate data from the OECD.
Table 1. Calibration of the model parameters
Parameter Value DescriptionbR 2:551 Average Real Interest Rate
A 1 Productivity level, numéraire of the production function
 0:35 Productivity Share of the Capital per unit of Human Capital
 1 Productivity of Education
 0:65 Elasticity of Human Capital to Education
n 0:22 Population Growth Rate
c 0:001 Minimum Consumption level
 0:9 Government revenue protability
Table 1 shows the main parameters of the model. We assign to the interest
rate a value of 2:551, which is consistent with the average real interest rate paid
by the OECD countries in 20082. From r it is possible to nd the value of per
capita capital bk; using equation (3) and the value of wage bw, using equation
(4). The parameter  usually takes value between 0.3 and 0.4. Here, we
decide for an intermediate value, thus  = 0:35. In the benchmark model, the
productivity level is assumed to be the numéraire of the production function.
Indeed, A is, for any given interest rate r, the parameter which levers the per
capita capital and wage.
The wage w earned by adult agents depends on the level of per capita hu-
man capital they are provided with, which, in turns, depends on the education
they received from their parents when they were young. Hence, at the steady
state, per capita wage w = bwh, where h =  e. Parameters  and  2 [0; 1]
explain the productivity of education. Here, we assigned to  a value of 1,
treating it as the numéraire of the human capital productivity and gave to 
a value of 0:65.
Population growth rate is obtained using data on total population from
the OECD countries. For the years from 1961 to 2010, the average annual
population growth for the participating countries is 0:008. We assign a value
2Source: OECD Database.
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to the population growth rate for the model according to the equation n =
(1 + 0:008)25   1, which gives us a value for n = 0:22.
The minimum consumption, which the household takes into account when
maximizing her utility with respect to the consumption of her parents, has a
value of 0:001, in harmony with the share of total consumption over GDP for
the OECD which in 2008 was equal to 74%.
In the benchmark model we assume a certain degree of ine¢ ciency of the
government, hence, just a fraction  of the money collected by the government
through the proportional tax on wage is redistributed to the households in
the form of subsidy to education and pensions. The inclusion of a degree of
government ine¢ ciency is not mandatory for the model to work, but is indeed
interesting to assume it in order to compare the result with the case in which
government is fully e¢ cient. Parameter  usually does not take values below
0:7, here we decide for a relatively low level of ine¢ ciency of the public sector,
assigning to  a value of 0:9.
Table 2. Target functions for parameters ,  and 
Parameter Target Function
 Such that 
1++
= 0:2
 Such that e = 0:1(bw + bRbk) e
 Such that  t = 0:4
The value of the parameters in equation (7), (i.e. ,  and ) are set
according to three precise objective function, as shown in Table 2. We seek
a value of , the temporal discount between current and future consumption,
such that the marginal propensity to saving is equal to 20%. The value of
, which expresses the altruism of the household towards her children, is set
such that the total expenditure in education is equal to 10% of the GDP. To
conclude, the value of , the altruism of the household towards her parents,
is set such that the proportional tax replicates the income tax of the OECD
countries for the year 2008, hence such that  t = 40%.
Table 3. Main results of the benchmark model
cy co e  p   
2:7e  03 7:3e  03 8:5e  05 1:5e  03 2:5e  04 0:333 0:319 3:528
Table 3 shows the main results of the benchmark model. Following the
calibration presented at the beginning of the section, the proportional tax on
wage collected by the government at the steady state is positive and precisely
equal to 0:4. Government redistributes the collected resources among house-
holds through a positive subsidy to education that adult agents use to nance
the formation of human capital of their children and positive pensions, paid
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to the retired agents. The total expenditure in education is also positive and
equal to the tenth part of the GDP and is consistent with a level of , the
altruism that adult agents have towards their children, which ensures that the
marginal propensity to saving is equal to 20%. Moreover, both consumption
when young and consumption when old are positive, with the value of the
latter variable higher than the minimum consumption level.
To conclude, the interest rate bR, as well as the steady state level of human
capital per capita, which, in turns, depends on the steady state expenditure
in education, ensure a positive level of GDP per capita.
4 Comparative Statics
The aim of the following section is to observe the response of the benchmark
model to population aging, as well as to other features of the model. To do
so, we rst compute the derivatives of the equations for the subsidy and the
proportional tax on wage at the steady state, then we evaluate them using the
numerical results of the benchmark model in order to check for their sign.
Table 4. Comparative Statics for subsidy 
Derivative @=@n @=@ @=@ @=@ @=@ bR @=@c
Sign + + + +    
When population ages, the dependency ratio of old agents to adult ones
rises, due to the higher number of retired people in the economy at time t,
which leads the individual to choose for a higher volume of pensions rather
than a subsidy to education. As a consequence of that, total expenditure in
education is low relative to the demand for pensions, resulting in a contraction
of the level of GDP per capita.
We can control for the population aging in the benchmark model by eval-
uating the rst derivative of the equation for the subsidy to education with
respect to the population growth rate and consider its reciprocal value. Indeed,
to assume an increase in the population growth rate is equal to assume an in-
crease in the number of young agents in the economy relative to old retired
ones.
Hence, we expect the rst derivative of the function for the subsidy  with
respect to the population growth rate n to be positive, as precisely shown
in Table 4, which reports the results of the main comparative statics for the
subsidy  we perform on the benchmark model.
Indeed, results indicate that an increase in the number of agents in working
age with respect to the retired ones, which follows the increase in the popu-
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lation growth rate, leads the amount of subsidy to education received by the
government to rise.
On the other hand, the same result indicates that, as population ages, the
change in the population structure in favour of the old agents, leads to a fall
in the subsidy to education paid by the government.
Hence, in this latter case, population aging entails an increase in the amount
of pensions demanded by the maximizing household. On the other hand, the
positive value of the parameter  ensures that total expenditure in education
does not decrease as a consequence of population aging, although this increase
is particularly small, relative to the increase in the demand for pensions3.
These results indicates that, as population ages, more public sources are de-
voted to pensions rather to education, resulting in a decrease in the level of
GDP per capita.
The rst derivative of the function for the subsidy  with respect to the
parameter  o¤ers an interesting point of view of the role of government ine¢ -
ciency in the redistribution of the resources. Bearing in mind that  indicates
the share of collected tax which is redistributed by the government, Table 4
shows that an increase in government e¢ ciency leads the subsidy to education
to increase, in the framework of the benchmark model.
Government ine¢ ciency can be led by multiple factors, as for instance cor-
ruption in the public sector or the presence of costs in the process of tax
collection. The results show that when such a ine¢ ciency gap is solved, the
government has more sources to redistribute in the form of pensions and sub-
sidy to education.
The rst derivative of the equation for the subsidy  with respect to the
parameters  and  check for the robustness of the benchmark model. The re-
sults in Table 4 show that an increase in  drives to an increase in , where an
increase in  sinks the demand for subsidy to education. Indeed, when individ-
uals have an interest in the education of their children which is higher relative
to the altruism with respect to their parents, they ask for a relatively higher
subsidy to education. On the other hand, when households are more altruistic
towards their parents, relative to their children, the demand for subsidy to
education falls, compensated by an increase in the demand for pensions.
The last two columns of Table 4 report the results of the rst derivative
of the equation for  with respect to the interest rate and the minimum con-
sumption level. The former shows that an increase in the interest rate drives
to an increase in the subsidy to education. Indeed, when the interest paid is
higher, the per capita wage received by the household decreases. Remarking
3The rst derivative of the equation for pension and the one for education with respect
to population growth rate, shows that an increase in the number of retired agents relative to
working agents leads the demand for pensions to increase by 2:07e 04 and total expenditure
in education to increase by 1:73e  05.
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that w = bwh, where the human capital per capita is h =  e, an decrease in
the per capita wage, assuming parameters  and  being constant, is caused
by an decrease of the role that education has in generating income for the
household. Hence, total expenditure in education falls, leading to a decrease
in the amount of  demanded.
On the other hand, an increase in the minimum consumption level leads to
a decrease in the level of the subsidy to education demanded by the households.
Certainly, when the sustainment level of consumption increases, retired agents
living in period t have less sources to nance their consumption, thus they
demand a higher amount of pensions relative to the subsidy to education.
Table 5. Comparative Statics for tax 
Derivative @=@n @=@ @=@ @=@ @=@ bR @=@c
Value     + + + +
We perform the same comparative statics we described above, for the case
of the proportional tax on wage  . Again, to simulate the e¤ects of popu-
lation aging, we compute the derivative of the equation for the proportional
tax on wage for the opposite case, in which the population growth rate rises,
with a consequent increase in the number of working agents relative to retired
ones. We expect this derivative, evaluated with the results of the numerical
simulation, to be negative. Indeed, as the number of working individuals in
the economy rises, the increase in the number of taxpayers might induce to
a decrease in the tax rate imposed by the government, conrming the results
obtained by Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002). Hence, the opposite interpre-
tation of the value shows that, as population ages the tax rate is expected to
increase.
Such result depends on the calibration of the model. As shown in Table
3, the high value of  relative to  indicates that in the benchmark model,
the individual is more altruistic towards her parents, hence in this baseline
framework, the greater part of the money collected by the government through
the proportional tax on wage is redistributed in the form of pensions. As
population ages, government is forced to increase the tax rate in order to
satisfy the increasing demand in social security measures.
The combined results of the e¤ects of population aging on the demand of
subsidy to education and the proportional tax rate set by the government,
remark that, as the population becomes older, the economy turns to be less
productive. Households demand for less education to their children and for
higher pensions to their parents, which in turns forces the government to rise
the scal pressure on the adult cohort.
This latter e¤ect could be compensated by an increase in the government
e¢ ciency. Table 5 shows that an increase in the parameter , which has to be
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interpreted as a more e¢ cient redistribution of the resources operated by the
government, decreases the steady state rate of the proportional tax on wage.
The rst derivative of the steady state condition for  with respect to the
interest rate conrms that, as the amount of interest paid to the households
increases, the per capita wage decreases, forcing the public sector to increase
the rate of the proportional tax rate.
To conclude, the last column of Table5 shows that, as the minimum con-
sumption level increases, the old agents living in the current period have less
resources to nance their consumption, hence the demand for pensions in-
creases, which leads the government to increase the rate of the proportional
tax on wage.
4.1 Population Aging and Government Ine¢ ciency
In order to show more in detail the e¤ect of the population aging, as well as
the e¤ect of the government ine¢ ciency in the modelled economy, we carry
out four di¤erent numerical simulations.
The aim of these simulations is to compute the demand for pensions in case
of a smaller and higher population growth rate relative to the benchmark case
in the framework of both an ine¢ cient and a fully e¢ cient public sector.
Model 1 and Model 2 are calibrated with a lower population growth rate
with respect to the benchmark model, assuming the case in which the depen-
dency ratio of old agents to adult ones rises. On the contrary, Model 3 and
Model 4 are calibrated with a higher population growth rate, assuming the
case of a fall in the dependency ratio. Furthermore, Model 1 and Model 3
assume that government is still ine¢ cient, hence just a fraction of the money
collected by the public sector are re-distributed among the households. On
the other hand, Model 2 and Model 4 assume a fully e¢ cient government in
which the parameter  takes its maximum value.
Model 1 and Model 2 are calibrated so to match data from Germany, while
Model 3 and Model 4 replicate data from China. The remaining parameters
are calibrated as in the benchmark model.
Table 6. Main results of Models 1, 2, 3 and 4
Variable n  p   
Benchmark Model 0:22 0:9 2:5e  04 1:5e  03 0:329 2:556
Model 1 0:073 0:9 2:7e  04 2:1e  04 0:318 2:751
Model 2 0:073 1 2:8e  04 1:35e  03 0:283 2:134
Model 3 0:467 0:9 1:9e  04 1:57e  03 0:345 2:342
Model 4 0:467 1 2:1e  04 1:9e  03 0:314 2:625
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The results reported in Table 6 show that, as n falls, the dependency ratio
of old to adult agents increases, the demand for pensions that the government
has to satisfy increases from 2:5e  04 to 2:7e  04, while the subsidy to edu-
cation falls from 1:5e  03 to 2:1e  04. These results are consistent with the
ndings explained previously in this section. Moreover, the decrease in the
parameter  and the increase in the parameter  indicate that, as n decreases
the maximizing individual is more altruistic towards her parents and less altru-
istic towards her children, relatively to the baseline model. Model 2 compares
the result obtained in Model 1, with the case of fully e¢ cient government. As
expected, the demand for pensions and the value of the subsidy rise, due to the
greater amount of resources that the government can redistribute among the
households. Model 3 assumes a higher population growth rate relative to the
benchmark case. Conversely with respect to the results obtained in Model 1,
the demand for pensions falls, while the value of the subsidy rises, according to
the increase of working agents living the economy at time t. Again, parameters
 and  respond as expected, increasing the altruism of the household towards
her children and decreasing the one relative to her parents.
The relationship between the altruism of the representative household to-
wards both her children and parents, and the ine¢ ciency of the government,
on the other hand, is not clear.
5 Empirical Evidence
Using data for the United States over the period 1970 - 2013, we examine the
e¤ects of population aging on the expenditure on education. In this section we
show that the empirical evidence not only tests for the structure of our model,
but is also consistent with its main implications. Indeed, the results have to
be considered as suggestive only, since we only imply OLS estimators and do
not test for alternative models.
We estimate a regression in which the endogenous variable, expenditure
on education (in logs), is function of the dependency ratio, dened as the
percentage of retired people with respect to the labor force, the government
expenditure devoted to social security, as well as the total government expendi-
ture (both in logs), the labor tax rate and the tax rate paid by the households
to nance social security policies. Hence, the regression includes also a test for
the relationship between the expenditure on education and the transfers for
pensions, the latter included in the total expenditure for social security. More-
over, our regression model is able to decompose the e¤ect on the government
expenditure on education of both the labor tax rate and the tax rate devoted
precisely to social security measures.
Expenditure on social protection includes pensions as well as other trans-
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fers such as unemployment and disability subsidies, though social security pay-
ments are by far the largest component of total security protection transfers.
Following Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002), who include an empirical test
for the relationship between the population aging and both the labor tax rate
and the per capita social transfer, we also include per capita GDP growth
and unemployment rate as explanatory variable. The inclusion of the real
growth in the domestic product controls for business cycle e¤ects, while the
unemployment rate controls for the expenditure on social protection which,
indeed, includes subsidies to unemployment.
5.1 Data Sources and Description
Data from the United States, for the dependency ratio, the per capita GDP
growth, the unemployment rate and both the expenditure on social protection
and total government expenditure are taken from the OECD Database and the
OECD reports "Pensions at a Glance" and "Education at a Glance" (2013).
The dependency ratio is computed as the ratio of people over 65 years and
people in the working age, older than 15 years and younger than 64 years,
in percentage. As population ages, the dependency ratio clearly follows an
increasing trend, with a value of 15:83% in 1970 and a value of 21:25% in
20134, and an average annual growth of 0:069% in the reference period.
As already pointed out, the expenditure in social protection includes the
government expenditure in social security (old-age pensions and benets) and
other social transfers, such as subsidies to unemployment and disability com-
pensations. For the year 2013, data from the U.S. reveal that expenditure
on social protection was 33% of the total government expenditure. Out of
this, 51% was devoted to social security payments, which represent by far the
largest component of the expenditure on social protection.
Data for the labor tax rate and the social security tax rate are taken from
the U.S. Tax Foundation. The social security tax rate indicates the percentage
of the taxes paid by the households devoted to social security measures.
4OECD projections on population indicate a Dependency Ratio for the United State
equal to 36:26% for the year 2050.
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5.2 Estimation Results
Table 7. Determinants of the Expenditure on Education
Expenditure On Education
Constant 0:0275 (0:1086)
Dependency Ratio  0:0068 (0:0019)
Per Capita GDP Growth  0:0012 (0:0004)
Expenditure On Social Protection  0:0639 (0:0562)
Total Government Expenditure 0:1761 (0:0839)
Labor Tax Rate 0:0437 (0:0389)
Social Security Tax Rate  0:6159 (0:3491)
Unemployment Rate  0:0241 (0:0110)
R2 0:9942
Number of Observations 43
Table 7 reports the results of our regression. We include a lag for the
dependent variable in order to minimize the possible problem of endogeneity
in the regression model. The equation is estimated with ordinary least squares.
The dependency ratio has a high statically signicant and negative impact
on the expenditure on education, as we expected from the model results. In-
deed, as population ages, more social protection transfers are demanded by
the households with a consequent decrease in the government expenditure de-
voted to education. Our empirical model shows that, as the dependency ratio
increases by 1%, the expenditure on education decreases by a factor of 0:68%.
Per capita GDP growth is high statistically signicant and appears to have
a negative impact on the expenditure on education. The theoretical model
shows an inverse relationship, since education participates to the formation of
human capital which is a production input. In this case, the negative rela-
tionship between the two variables can be explained as the data we used when
carrying out the regression. Due to the increasing trend in the dependency ra-
tio and the shift of government investments from education to social protection
measures, an increase in the GDP growth might lead to lower investments in
education. This interpretation is somehow conrmed by the negative, although
not statistically signicant, coe¢ cient of the expenditure on social protection.
The results show that, as population ages, the increase in the dependency ratio
leads the government to invest more in social protection, with the consequent
contraction in the expenditure on education.
The positive coe¢ cients associated to the total government expenditure
and the labor tax rate, the former statistically signicant at a 5% level, the
latter not statistically signicant, are consistent with our theoretical model.
As the government rises the rate of the tax paid by the households, more
resources can be redistributed among the households, hence both variables
have a positive e¤ect on the expenditure on education.
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On the other hand, when only the rate of the taxes used to nance social
security policies is raised by the government, the expenditure on education
decreases, as shown by the coe¢ cient of the social security tax rate, which is
statistically signicant with 10% condence level.
To conclude, the unemployment rate is high statistically signicant and
has a negative e¤ect on the dependent variable. Indeed, as explained above,
the increase in the unemployment rate, forces the government to invest more
in social protection transfers which, as we already said, has a negative e¤ect
on the expenditure on education. Such interpretation appears to be consistent
with our model, although Daveri and Tabellini (2000) suggest reverse causality
between unemployment and social transfers from the government, pointing out
that the increase in the unemployment rate might be precisely the consequence
of the low transfers operated by the public sector.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we analyze the e¤ects of population aging on the redistribu-
tion of resources operated by the public sector focusing, in particular, on the
expenditure on education and the expenditure on social security.
We build a simple overlapping generations model in which three generations
of household live in every period. Young agents neither consume nor work
and are just supplied with education by their parents, who contribute to the
formation of their human capital, which is used as a production input. Adult
households work and allocate their wage, net to a proportional tax collected by
the government, among the current and future consumption and the education
provided to their children. Old individuals are retired and use their savings
and pensions to nance their consumption. The government plays a role in
the economy redistributing the resources among the individuals in the form of
subsidy to education to adult agents and pensions to the retired ones.
A numerical simulation of the model shows that, as the dependency ratio
of old people with respect of the labour force increases, government allocates
more resources to the security system rather than to the education, with a
consequent increase in the pensions volume and a decrease in the subsidy
to education. Since education participates to the formation of human capital,
which a¤ects directly the wage per capita, the capita per capital and, of course,
the GDP per capita, the aging of population leads to a contraction in the
productivity of the economy.
Our model accounts also for the presence of ine¢ ciency in the public sector,
hence not all the resources collected by the government are redistributed among
the taxpayers.
We run four di¤erent numerical simulation so to compare the results with
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the benchmark model. The new versions show both the e¤ects of an increase
and a decrease in the dependency ratio and a decrease in government ine¢ -
ciency.
Projections for the 2050 show that the aging of the baby boom generations,
as well as the estimated decrease in the fertility rate, will increase the depen-
dency ratio, with evident negative consequences on the income distribution
among households and inequality, conrming the results obtained by Perotti
(1993). We show that the ine¢ ciency of the government also plays a crucial
role in this mechanism, hence an improvement in the public sector structure is
like to compensate the negative e¤ects of population aging. On the other hand,
the increase in the dependency ratio must be seen as a natural consequence
of the better living standards and the rise in the life expectancies in both the
developed and developing countries.
In general, the academic literature o¤ers a pessimistic vision of the issue.
In particular, Lindbeck and Persson (2003), as well as Sanderson and Sherbov
(2007) and Iturbe-Ormaetxe and Valera (2010) suggest a necessary reform in
the pension system in order not to penalize the young generations, the former
with a general comparison of di¤erent pensions transfers schemes, the latter
through a study of possible reforms proposed in the last years.
On the other hand, there are also examples of more optimistic interpreta-
tions as, for instance, Boldrin and Montes (2009), who, improving the structure
of a previous study of them, Boldrin and Montes (2005), employ an overlapping
generations model to show that, as population ages, government policies do
not seem to favor older relative to younger generations. Indeed, they nd out
that, even though young agents receive less investments in education, they are
predict to pay a lower interest rate on the educational transfers that they re-
ceived on their youth, which might compensate the negative e¤ect and, overall,
leave them better o¤.
Here, we take an intermediate position. If on one side it is clearly not likely
to generate policies able to invert the trend in the dependency ratio, on the
other, we shown that policy makers have a discrete number of variables to
work on in order to compensate the negative e¤ects of population aging.
Among them, reforms on the pensions payment systems are the more sug-
gested by the literature, while our ndings indicates that reforms on the struc-
ture of the public sector and improvements of its e¢ ciency are possible policies
able to compensate the consequences of the population aging trend.
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